Economic Development, Tax Incentives and The Plutocracy It's Creating

Tax incentives have become part of the economic development lexicon. The public sector has become a crucial funding cog in private sector projects. If not for the public injection of funding, the project, supposedly, would not get done. So much for the "free" market.

A quick perusal of news stories of the last few months are littered with tales of incentives creating jobs and growth. Such as the stories about how much sport teams add to the local economy and how much the new Amazon facility in Kenosha will boost their prospects.

The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, in Green Bay Prepares For Playoff Game At Lambeau,

"The estimated impact is $14 million," said Toll, who, maybe only because he was standing with the Packers stadium in the background, bears a surprising resemblance the stadium's namesake. Advance ripples of that economic wave arrived first thing Monday morning, with fans streaming into the Packers Pro Shop and snatching up all the NFC North Division champions baseball hats by noon.

Sadly, the boost felt in Green Bay is a loss for others. Unless the money spent is above and beyond what would have already been spent, there is no growth taking place. If consumers merely traded dinner and a movie for Packer memorabilia and tickets, there is not growth, but merely a realignment of spending.

Another blogger wrote, "Whether or not you like the priorities, pro sports are one of the few things that seem to be booming and sparking the Wisconsin economy in 2017, and we'll see more examples of it today."

Much of this optimism seems prefaced on the Build-It-And-They-Will-Come mantra. Much of this new development will simply displace and devalue older businesses. Again, realigning spending, and in the case of sports (or large, big-box retailers), funneling money to absentee landlords -- persons or businesses that do not live in the city or state from which they are receiving funding and consumer spending.

Gregg Easterbrook, of The Atlantic, detailed How The NFL Fleeces Taxpayers.

Judith Grant Long, a Harvard University professor of urban planning, calculates that league-wide, 70 percent of the capital cost of NFL stadiums has been provided by taxpayers, not NFL owners. Many cities, counties, and states also pay the stadiums’ ongoing costs, by providing power, sewer services, other infrastructure, and stadium improvements. When ongoing costs are added, Long’s research finds, the Buffalo Bills, Cincinnati Bengals, Cleveland Browns, Houston Texans, Indianapolis Colts, Jacksonville Jaguars, Kansas City Chiefs, New Orleans Saints, San Diego Chargers, St. Louis Rams, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and Tennessee Titans have turned a profit on stadium subsidies alone—receiving more money from the public than they needed to build their facilities. Long’s estimates show that just three NFL franchises—the New England Patriots, New York Giants, and New York Jets—have paid three-quarters or more of their stadium capital costs.

Many NFL teams have also cut sweetheart deals to avoid taxes. The futuristic new field where the Dallas Cowboys play, with its 80,000 seats, go-go dancers on upper decks, and built-in nightclubs, has been appraised at nearly $1 billion. At the basic property-tax rate of Arlington, Texas, where the stadium is located, Cowboys owner Jerry Jones would owe at least $6 million a year in property taxes. Instead he receives no property-tax bill, so Tarrant County taxes the property of average people more than it otherwise would.

The situation has become so distorted that the revenues from suites, club seats and national TV deals are more important to most NFL teams than the average seats at stadiums.

The development panacea has trickled into college sports, too. As Eben Novy-Williams describes in College Football’s Top Teams Are Built on Crippling Debt:

Football critics nationwide often point to multimillion-dollar coaches as emblems of excess. They should be more worried about debt, which costs more and lasts longer. A high-priced coach might earn $4 million to $5 million a year. Meanwhile, according to public records, athletic departments at least 13 schools in the country have long-term debt obligations of more than $150 million as of 2014—money usually borrowed to build ever-nicer facilities for the football team. 

For some schools, millions in TV money can support a high level of debt service. That includes the University of Alabama, which plays Clemson for the national championship on Monday. The Crimson Tide owes $225 million over the next 28 years. In the Big Ten, also flush from a rich media deal, the University of Illinois owes more than $260 million. If that revenue stream fails to grow or starts to drop, as it already has for some programs in the top tier of college football, the results could be crippling.

How can these can't-fail projects, guaranteed to bring jobs and growth, lead to such debt? The reality appears to be almost exactly the opposite of what all the boosters are claiming. The beneficiaries of these projects are not workers or the community, in general, but the ownership that gets to avoid costs and pocket the profits.

Much has also been made of the new Amazon development in Kenosha. Again, supposedly, a big win for the community and its workers. First, this ignores the numerous stories of the abusive practices in Amazon warehouses. The company has been investigated by OSHA over its warehouse practices. Second, these warehouse jobs are low-wage and typically temporary positions. The pay is usually 16% lower than average warehouse worker pay. The Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR) found that local brick-and-mortar retailers employ 47 people for every $10 million in sales, Amazon employs just 19 people for every $10 million in sales.

Between 2012 and 2014, Amazon extracted $431 million in tax incentives and other subsidies from local and state governments. ILSR also found that Amazon has eliminated about 149,000 more jobs in retail than it has created in its warehouses.

As Daniel Gross explains, "Paying more, making work more attractive, and offering perks is one tried and tested way of meeting the need for labor when labor markets are tight. Another tack is to design machines, systems, and consumer experiences that reduce or eliminate the need for human labor. Amazon is doing that, too. The New York Times reported in December that Amazon is now experimenting with a retail concept dubbed Amazon Go. It has built an 1,800-square-foot store in one of its office buildings in Seattle that should start operations next year. Open at first only to Amazon employees, it will be stocked with drinks, snacks, and prepared meals. One thing it won’t be filled with is many retail employees. The store will be outfitted with technology — a smartphone app, scanners, sensors — that will enable people essentially to load goods into their bag, then walk out and pay without stopping at a check-out lane." Thus, while Amazon takes these subsidies whilst promising jobs, they are actively pursuing strategies to eliminate their need for workers.

Amazon received $21.8 million in TIF subsidies for the Kenosha facility and $10.3 million in state enterprise zone tax credits. These final subsidy numbers also increased from the originally proposed $17 million TIF subsidy and $7 million in credits.

All of these subsidies have helped Amazon grow from a 2006 market value of $17.5 billion to a 2016 market value of $355.9 billion. 8 other large retailers, over the same period, have seen their combined market value drop $102.4 billion.

This phenomenon ties into recent research on Rising U.S. Business Concentration and The Decline in Labor's Share of Income.

The economists look at firm-level data on the labor share of income to see what’s happening. Using firm-level data on sales and employee compensation, they find a strong correlation between increasing concentration of sales among firms and a lower share of income accruing to workers in the same industry. The five economists argue that competition within these industries is shifting income toward successful, less labor-intensive firms “superstar firms.” 

Note that it’s not a lack of competition resulting in higher price markups that’s causing the decline in the labor share of income in these industries, as some other research has argued. Rather, this new paper emphasizes the role of competition in shifting sales toward firms with a lower share of income going to workers. The analysis of the data by the five authors shows that most of the decline is due to the shift in higher sales toward firms with low labor shares.

Much of this tax incentive, economic development paradigm seems to be funneling money into fewer and fewer, select hands. Whether it be sport or big-box retailers, much of the incentives offered seem to be counterproductive and often fail on delivering the jobs and growth for the communities and their workers.

For Further Reading:
With 6,000 New Warehouses Jobs, What Is Amazon Really Delivering?
4 Ways Amazon's Ruthless Practices Are Crushing Local Economies
A Local Book Publisher Laments Amazon's Impact
Before You Click On Amazon, Here's Why Your Choice Matters
How Amazon's Tightening Grip On The Economy Is Stifling Competition, Eroding Jobs and Threatening Communities
Will Amazon Fool Us Twice?

The Bigger-Is-Better Racket

Since Reaganomics began eviscerating the middle class, mergers and a bigger-is-better attitude has dominated our development and economic thinking. Economies of scale were going to trickle down riches on each and every one of us.

But, it turns out, much of this was just merely oligopoly power solidifying itself. Big companies became too big to fail, and the wages of most workers stagnated.

In our haste to believe that all we'd learned from the Great Depression was wrong, we marched ahead cutting taxes, cutting regulation, getting government out of the way of all-knowing business. Zoning laws changed and development intensified.

The small mom-and-pops, which were the hubs of smaller communities throughout the nation, were inefficient and antiquated. Travel patterns were changed. The off-ramp economy was the path to prosperity. A new automobile-dominated society was deemed superior. Big boxes and one-stop shopping were supposed to transform daily life, for all, for the better.

But what happens when the oligopoly changes the lifestyle in a community, only to desert it years later?

First, the traffic to-and-from these megaplexes disrupts as much as it invigorates:

Traffic and noise depress property values in nearby neighborhoods. More traffic in- creases the cost of local government services, such as road maintenance and police. [source]

Many of these big boxes also use their size and strength to avoid taxation:

As one example, take Walmart, the largest among them, which looks for tax loopholes wherever it can find them. “For every kind of tax that a retail company would normally pay or remit to support public services, Walmart has engineered an aggressive scheme to pay less and keep more,” found a 2011 report by the non-profit research organization Good Jobs First. These include using its fleet of lawyers to systematically challenge its property tax assessments, and gimmicks such as deducting rent payments made to itself through captive real estate investment trusts. Good Jobs First calculated that these tactics cost state and local governments more than $400 million a year in lost revenue, and concluded, “Walmart may be more of a fiscal burden than a benefit to many of the communities in which it operates.”

Much of the cost for the employees at these big boxes is placed upon the locality and the state:

Large numbers of big-box employees rely on Medicaid, food stamps, and other public assistance programs to get by. Several states have reported that their Medicaid rolls are now swollen with su- perstore workers. In 2005, for example, Massachusetts disclosed that some 9,500 Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and Target em- ployees and dependents were receiving publicly-funded health care at an annual cost to taxpayers of over $12 million.

Perhaps most disturbing, researchers at Penn State University, after controlling for other factors that influence poverty, found that counties that gained Wal-Mart stores during the 1990s fared worse in terms of family poverty rates than those that did not. [source]

It's also been found that these big boxes hurt the local job market:

As these businesses are forced to down- size or close, the resulting job losses typi- cally equal or exceed the number of new jobs created by the big-box store.This was recently shown in a large-scale study con- ducted by Univ. of California economist David Nuemark and his colleagues at the Public Policy Institute of California. The study examined 3,094 counties across the U.S., tracking the arrival of Wal-Mart stores between 1977 and 2002.

The study found that the opening of a Wal- Mart led to a net loss of 150 retail jobs on average, suggesting that each Wal-Mart em- ployee replaces approximately 1.4 workers at other stores.

And when they leave, they typically leave blight behind. As the Institute for Local Self-Reliance discovered:

These stores tend to remain vacant because retailers often continue paying rent or take other steps to block competitors from occupy- ing the site. Clauses in many big-box lease agreements forbid property owners from leas- ing the building to another company without the original tenant's approval.

They come to town, change the traffic flow and the character of the place, they push many of the costs of their employees onto the locality and the state, they avoid their fair share of taxes, they pocket a financial windfall, and then they leave town.

When it comes to economic development, place-making and community, bigger isn't always better.

For Further Reading:

Walmart: It Came, It Conquered, Now It's Packing Up & Leaving
The Perils Of Walmart Dependence
Big, Empty Boxes
Impact of Big-Box Stores on Taxes and Public Costs

About Meijer Grocery Coming To Wisconsin...

Think you'll be saving money by shopping at Meijer? Think again.

Here we have yet another large corporation using their boardroom of lawyers to lower their property taxes...which means you'll be paying more.

In a long-building tax avoidance scheme, big businesses and their lawyers, with the help of malleable appraisers and tax representatives, are turning the appraisal profession on its head.

Some basic economic principles are imbued in property appraisal. Substitution is the idea that a comparable must not only be similar physically, but also economically (similar rents, expenses, etc.).

Typically the details and length of the lease are common factors a buyer would consider when contemplating the purchase of an income-producing property. The appraisal profession typically considers the rents a property can charge an outcome of the location - the land. Now, according to the lawyers, the value is due to goodwill and other intangibles...and, conveniently, most of these aren't taxable.

Take Walgreens, a court recently ruled that sales of Walgreens weren't good comparables or good indicators of value for ... Walgreens. Typical retail, a closed Blockbuster store, and mom-and-pop stores were deemed more comparable.

The City of Milwaukee recently settled a property tax dispute, dating back to 2010, with Walgreens, on 18 of their stores. The settlement was for $3.7 million dollars.

Opinions in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel on the topic (incorrect grammar and all) were things like: "Is it any wonder why citizens and businesses want to get out of the City?" or "This should be good news for mayor Berrett now he has another excuse for not fixing the pot holes on almost every street in the city. Waite for him to try increasing the wheel tax again. Which reminds me is he spending any of the wheel tax money on streets."

So, giving a business a refund of $3.7 million is a reason for a business to go away? Not to mention, the $3.7 million Walgreens is not paying, now has to be paid by other citizens. When corporations avoid paying their fair share, everyone else has to pick up the slack.

Much of what this case hinges on is that fact that Walgreens claim the leases they have are not market rate and actual sales of other Walgreens are also not comparable market transactions.

On the transfer returns (which names the buyer and seller; and separates real estate, equipment and business value) for the Walgreens sales, the Property owners claimed the total sale prices were for the real estate. Plus, in their actual leases on these properties, they specifically state these are real leases and not financing instruments. [Transfer returns and court transcripts, which contain this, are public information.]

Yet, in court they have claimed just the opposite. And the judge agreed in a City of Madison v. Walgreens court case. Although, if we're going to accept these revelations as true, this means that Walgreens has submitted falsified transfer returns and entered into bogus contractual leases.

Much of how a property's value is declared is based on accounting - wherever they can shift the supposed value to lower their taxes the most (based on things like depreciation, etc.), that's where they'll enter it in the ledger. A Walgreens is built to be a Walgreens, nothing else. Just as other special purpose properties (like gas stations, car washes, etc.) are built for a specific use. The builder/owner does this because they expect a certain return on their investment at that specific site.

Walgreens feels more appropriate comparable properties, to establish the value of their properties, are vacant buildings and and other neighborhood establishments.

This is like saying to find out what my Chevy Camaro is worth I should look at what Ford Taurus' are selling for. They're both cars, right?

The court completely ignores the concept of substitution. A property is only comparable if a buyer would actually consider it as an alternative investment. A vacant store does not have the same marketability and value as a store with a 25-year lease.

If a current owner of a Walgreens store were to sell, he/she would base the sales price on what the income stream is worth - how much he/she gets from the leases. Which is why most Walgreens sell at twice what Walgreens are claiming they are worth in court.

This whole fiasco ignores the general market that is the triple-net lease, investment grade properties. These are properties under long-term leases (usually 25 years) where the tenants pay the expenses. Thus vacancy (a typical deduction from the cash flow) is non-existent for the property owner. And, expenses are minimal to non-existent since they are the responsibility of the tenant. For these reasons, the standard Walgreens drug store sells for $467 per square foot at a 5.6% capitalization rate. The minimum typical footprint of a Walgreens is 12,000 square feet; this equates to a $5,604,000 value (or a rental rate of roughly $26 per square foot).

Even though the market evidence indicates this is what typical investors buy and sell these properties for, Walgreens astonishingly claims the stores are only worth half that.

All of these factors corroborated the City's assessments on the Walgreens' properties. Yet, for some inexplicable reason, the judge bought Walgreens' self-interested and contradictory argument and decided rather than comparing apples to apples, one should compare apples and rotten apples. And, because of this, my fellow taxpayers, you will pay more since Walgreens is paying less.

And taxpayers should be upset over this (and start complaining to their city attorney office to fight back against this shakedown) because the ambulance-chasing lawyers tax representatives are trying to use these same arguments all over the country on restaurants, big box stores and a whole host of other properties. Which means, in the next few years, residential home owners will be paying a lot more, while commercial property owners will laughing all the way to the bank.

And, for big boxes (like Meijer, Target, Walmart, Lowes), some courts have decided the best comparable indicators of value are vacant, or "dark", stores. Somehow, a building that is closed and out of business is a viable alternative investment to an successfully operating one.

Olivia LaVecchia has more of the gruesome details:

Figuring out the value of a property can be a complicated business. In Michigan, town and county assessors typically use a property’s construction costs, minus depreciation, as a primary metric to determine its fair market value; taxable value is half that amount. Property owners sometimes prefer, instead, to use the sale prices of comparable properties. This was the approach that Lowe’s took—with a catch. Lowe’s looked at the definition of the word “comparable,” and decided to stretch it. It said that, because big-box stores are designed to be functionally obsolescent, comparable stores are those that have been closed and are sitting empty—the “dark stores” behind this method’s name... 

It’s an established part of the big-box retail model that the boxes themselves be custom-built, cheaply constructed, and disposable. If retailers decide that they need a bigger space, it’s cheaper for them to leave the old one behind and build a new one. When Walmart, for instance, opened its wave of new, twice-the-size Supercenters across the country in 2007, it left hundreds of vacant stores behind it. This means that new, successful stores like the Marquette Lowe’s are rarely the locations that are up for sale, and that when big-box stores do come on the market, it’s because they’ve already failed or been abandoned by the retailer that built them. In other words, Lowe’s was saying, it had built a property that, despite generating roughly $30 million in annual sales for the company, had very little value, and because of that, it should get a break in its property taxes... 

Despite all of this, cities and towns continue to buy into the myth, sold to them by the mega-retailers themselves, that big-box stores spark economic development. In service of this myth, local and state governments across the country have granted at least $2.6 billion in subsidies to just six large retailers, including $160 million to Walmart and $138 million to Lowe’s, according to another study from Good Jobs First.

When these businesses use their clout to avoid taxation, all other taxpayers pay more.

For Further Reading:
For Cities, Big Box Stores Are Becoming Even More Of A Terrible Deal
Multibillion dollar Meijer, Inc. finds another way to screw Michigan cities and kids

Meijer tax ruling may reverberate statewide

Unfair Comparisons? Meijer, other big-box retailers use ‘dark store’ loophole to cut their Michigan property tax bills

Meijer Stores LP v Marion County Assessor

Big box stores ringing up property tax discounts

For Cities, Big-Box Stores Are Becoming Even More of a Terrible Deal

Are big-box retailers getting a tax break at schools’ expense?

'Dark store' theory benefits Meijer, other big retailers